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Abstract 
Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant’s notion of actual object presupposes the notion of 
truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgment with an 
actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant’s notions of truth, 
object, and actuality. I argue that Kant’s notion of actual object does not presuppose 
the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a 
judgment with an actual object. 
 
Introduction* 
Can an idealist endorse a correspondence theory of truth, or are correspondence 
theories inextricably bound to metaphysical realism? Philosophers have given differing 
answers to this question. 1  However, explicit arguments for the compatibility or 
incompatibility of idealism and correspondence theories are rare finds. Many 
philosophers, such as Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman,2 simply assumed that only 
realists can be correspondence theorists. Several of their opponents pointed out that 
they see no reason why an idealist cannot have a correspondence theory of truth.3 
A similar situation can be found in the literature on Kant. Many interpreters 
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assumed that Kant, being an idealist about objects in space and time, cannot endorse a 
correspondence theory of truth for judgments on those objects.4 However, few authors 
provided arguments in support of this claim. 
This paper discusses one of those rare arguments. It will be named “Cassirer’s 
argument,” from its most famous upholder. The paper argues that Cassirer’s argument 
fails to prove that Kant cannot have a correspondence theory of truth. 
The assumption that Kant was an idealist about objects in space and time will not 
be questioned here. I will only argue that Kant’s conception of spatio-temporal objects 
is immune from Cassirer’s objection. This paper solely considers Kant’s Critical 
views, understood as the views that Kant endorsed from 1781 to his death in 1804. 
The study of Cassirer’s argument is interesting for three reasons. First, it sheds 
light on the relations between Kant’s notions of object, truth, and actuality, which play 
a central role in his Critical philosophy. Second, it contributes to the discussion of the 
intricate and debated question, whether Kant had or rejected a correspondence theory 
of truth. Third, it provides us with some insight into the relation between idealism and 
correspondence theories of truth. 
1 Cassirer’s Interpretation 
Cassirer outlines his interpretation of Kant’s conception of truth in passages like the 
following: 
If it is possible to designate the determination of the relation between truth 
and actuality as the general topic of epistemology, then particular historical 
ages differ from each other in that they conceive of those two concepts, 
whose relation is to be established, in a different order and sequence. […] 
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[T]here is a characteristic difference as to whether one starts the investigation 
from the one or the other concept: whether the “being” of things counts as the 
certain, given element, and we move from it to orientate ourselves with 
respect to the sense and content of the concept of truth, or whether, vice 
versa, one attempts to determine the ultimate significance of objective 
judgments moving from the validity of determinate criteria of truth, which 
are regarded as certain.5 
According to Cassirer, Kant rejects the first horn of the alternative. In order to 
explain what truth is, “the concept of ‘object’ does not enable us to give any 
satisfactory answer.”6 This is because, for Kant, “the explanation that the truth of a 
cognition means its ‘agreement with the object’ proves to be circular.”7 “[I]t is not 
because there is a world of objects that there is for us, as their impression and image, a 
world of cognitions and truths; rather, because there are unconditionally certain 
judgments […] there is for us an order which is designated not only as an order of 
impressions and representations, but also as an order of objects.”8 “[I]n the Critical 
sense, the truth [i.e., actuality] of the object is always to be grasped and substantiated 
only through the truth of the judgment.”9 Truth, or at least empirical truth, is to be 
defined as the coherence of a judgment with the deliverances of the senses and with 
the laws which govern their synthesis (hereafter called “the transcendental laws of 
knowledge”).10 Actual objects are to be defined as those items whose existence is 
implied by true judgments. The very notion of actual object is to be defined by means 
of the notion of true judgment.11 
If this is so, then of course true judgments correspond with actual objects, or more 
precisely, with the objects they are about. However, this explains at most what an 
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actual object is, and not what truth is. If Kant tried to perspicuously explain what truth 
is by means of the notion of actual object, he would formulate a circular explanation, 
because the notion of actual object is to be explained by means of the notion of truth. It 
follows that Kant cannot have a correspondence theory of truth. He can have at most a 
correspondence theory of objects. 
2 Formulating Cassirer’s Argument 
A precise formulation of Cassirer’s argument is provided below, preceded by four 
points. 
First, following Kant’s usage, truth-bearers will be called “judgments” or 
“cognitions.” No attempt will be made to clarify precisely what Kantian judgments and 
cognitions are. The focus will be on those judgments which can be true or false, 
although some judgments, such as judgments of perception, might not bear any truth-
value for Kant. 
Second, objects, and not facts, will be regarded as the items with which judgments 
must correspond to be true. Kant constantly mentions the correspondence of judgments 
or cognitions with objects, and not with facts. Consider for instance the following 
passage of the first Critique: 
T1 If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object 
must thereby be distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it does not 
agree with the object to which it is related even if it contains something that could 
well be valid of other objects. (A 58/B 83, italics added)12 
Third, the fact that there are true judgments about non-existent objects will not be 
taken into account. If only actual objects are truth-makers of Kantian judgments, it 
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might be hard to find truth-makers for judgments about non-existent objects. Kant does 
not provide any suggestion as to how one might solve this problem, and this paper will 
not solve it on Kant’s behalf. 
Fourth, a pessimistic attitude towards circularity will be adopted. Kant states that 
definitions cannot be circular in his logic lectures (L. Dohna, 24:7606-11; Wiener L., 
24:92421-29; L. Bauch, RT 127, p. 261119-121). For Cassirer, the fact that the notion of 
object is defined by means of the notion of truth provides a good reason to reject a 
definition of truth which employs the notion of object. Kant and Cassirer do not grant 
that, under certain circumstances, circular definitions and explanations are acceptable. 
In the last thirty years, however, philosophers have produced good arguments for the 
claim that circular definitions and explanations are not always “vicious,” but they are 
sometimes acceptable, or even recommendable. 13  This discussion of Cassirer’s 
argument will not rely on their claim. It will adopt Kant’s and Cassirer’s restrictive 
view that no circular definition or explanation should be accepted. Then, it will argue 
that Kant’s eventual endorsement of a correspondence theory of truth does not involve 
any circular definition or explanation. 
Cassirer’s argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
(C1) In a correspondence theory of truth, the notion of truth cannot appear in the 
definition of actual object, or in the most perspicuous explanation of what an 
actual object is. 
 (C2) Kant’s definition or most perspicuous explanation of the notion of an actual 
object employs the notion of truth. 
∴
 
(C3) Kant cannot have a correspondence theory of truth. 
Is this argument correct? C1 is not contentious, at least as long as we reject every 
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circular explanation. If truth is defined as the correspondence of a judgment with an 
actual object, and if the notion of truth appears in the definition or, in absence of a 
definition, in the most perspicuous explanation of the notion of actual object, the 
definition of truth will be circular, and therefore it should be rejected. C3 follows from 
C1 and C2. Then, the question to answer is whether C2 is true, or in other words, 
whether Kant’s definition or most perspicuous explanation of the notion of actual 
object employs the notion of truth. It is necessary to inquire into whether the notion of 
truth appears in Kant’s definition or explanation of the notion of object, or in his 
definition or explanation of the notion of actuality, for these are the two components of 
the notion of actual object. 
3 Two Notions of Object 
The English word “object” corresponds to two words in Kant’s lexicon: “Object” 
(often replaced with the modern form “Objekt” by the editors of Kant’s works) and 
“Gegenstand.” 14  Kant sometimes uses the term “Object” to designate phenomenal 
objects. For instance, he writes in the B-Deduction: 
T2 Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in 
the determinate relation of given representations to an object [Object]. An object
[Object], however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition 
is united. (B 137) 
Here, the term “Object” designates phenomenal objects, because only phenomenal 
objects, but not things in themselves, derive from the unification of the manifold of 
intuition.15 
Elsewhere, Kant distinguishes between a broad sense and a narrow sense of the 
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word “Object.” Consider, for instance, the following passage from the second analogy 
of experience: 
T3 Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every representation, insofar as 
one is conscious of it, an object [Object]; only what this word is to mean in the 
case of appearances, not insofar as they are (as representations) objects [Objecte], 
but rather only insofar as they designate an object [Object], requires a deeper 
investigation. […] appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of 
apprehension, can […] only be represented as the object [Object] that is distinct 
from them if it stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other 
apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in 
the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of 
apprehension is the object [Object]. (A 189-191/B 234-236) 
The last occurrence of “Object” in T3 has the same meaning which “Object” has 
in T2. In both passages, “Object” designates phenomenal objects. In the terms of T2, 
these objects derive from the unification of the manifold of intuition by means of a 
priori concepts. In the terms of T3, these objects derive from the unification of an 
apprehended manifold by means of necessary rules. The manifold of intuition of T2 is 
the apprehended manifold of T3. The a priori concepts of T2 are the necessary rules of 
T3. They are the categories, which Kant sometimes calls “rules” (e.g., in B 145). 
The first occurrence of “Object” in T3 employs this word in a broader sense, 
which does not only encompass phenomenal objects, but also every representation.16 
In other passages, Kant uses the term “Gegenstand,” rather than “Object,” in a broad 
sense. Consider, for instance, the following passages of the first Critique: 
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T4 All representations, as representations, have their object [Gegenstand], and can 
themselves be objects [Gegenstände] of other representations in turn. (A 108, 
italics added) 
T5 The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin a transcendental 
philosophy is usually the division between the possible and the impossible. But 
since every division presupposes a concept that is to be divided, a still higher one 
must be given, and this is the concept of an object [Gegenstande] in general (taken 
problematically, leaving undecided whether it is something or nothing). (A 290/B 
346; see M. Dohna, 24:622) 
Other passages use the term “Gegenstand” in a narrow sense, to designate 
phenomenal objects. Below is an example: 
T6 The sensible faculty of intuition is really only a receptivity for being affected in a 
certain way with representations […], which, insofar as they are connected and 
determinable in these relations (in space and time) according to laws of the unity 
of experience, are called objects [Gegenstände]. (A 494/B 522; see also A 106) 
The laws of the unity of experience, mentioned in this passage, are the transcendental 
laws of knowledge. Phenomenal objects are the objects which arise, or which can be 
represented, as the result of a synthesis (or in the terms of T6, a connection and 
determination) of empirical intuitions according to those laws. 
This battery of quotations supports two claims. The first claim is that Kant 
distinguishes between a broad sense and a narrow sense of “object”: 
If one can have a mental representation of x, then x is an object in the broad 
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sense (see T3, T5). 
If one can have a mental representation of x as the result of the synthesis of 
the manifold of empirical intuition according to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge, then x is an object in the narrow sense (see T2, T3, T6). 
Objects in the narrow sense include only phenomenal objects. Objects in the 
broad sense include, besides phenomenal objects: items which cannot be given in any 
experience, like a flat geometrical figure enclosed by two straight lines (A 220/B 268), 
God, and things in themselves, and other items which do not derive from the synthesis 
of empirical intuitions, such as numbers and a priori concepts. By contrast, objects in 
the broad sense do not include items which possess incompatible properties at the 
same time and under the same respect, such as a square circle. This is because: an 
object in the broad sense is something of which one can have a mental representation; 
according to Kant, it is impossible to have mental representations which violate the 
law of contradiction (B xxvi n.); and representations of items which have incompatible 
properties violate the law of contradiction. 
The second claim which Kant’s texts support is that he does not make any clear-
cut, systematical, and consistent difference in meaning between the terms “Object” and 
“Gegenstand.” In fact, the quoted passages employ the term “Object,” as well as 
“Gegenstand,” to designate objects in the broad sense and objects in the narrow sense 
alike. In addition, the passages which define truth as the agreement of cognitions with 
objects use sometimes the term “Object,” and other times the term “Gegenstand.” For 
instance, T1 describes truth as the agreement of a cognition with its Gegenstand, 
whereas A 820-821/B 848-849 describes truth as “agreement with the Objecte.” Kant’s 
use of “Object” and “Gegenstand” in these passages is fully interchangeable.17 
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4 Objects and Truth 
Kant’s texts never characterize objects in the broad sense by means of the notion of 
truth. For instance, the beginning of T3 contains a characterization of objects in the 
broad sense without mention of truth. Objects in the broad sense include items such as 
things in themselves, concepts, and numbers, yet Kant’s texts do not provide any 
reason to characterize these items by means of the notion of truth. 
Kant might characterize objects in the narrow sense by means of the notion of 
truth. Two remarks might give some plausibility to this view. First, Kant writes that, 
given transcendental idealism, “the objects must conform to our cognition” (B xvi), 
and “the representation alone makes the object possible” (B 124-125). With these 
statements, Kant might be suggesting that the notion of true cognition or true 
representation is at the basis of his notion of phenomenal object. Second, the 
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason describes mental processes 
that contribute to the constitution of phenomenal objects. How our mental 
representations can relate to objects is a leitmotiv of the Transcendental Analytic. The 
relation of representations to objects is also involved in the nominal definition of truth: 
truth, Kant writes, is the agreement of a cognition with the object to which it is related 
(A 48/B 83; L. Pölitz, 24:52526-28; Jäsche-L., 9:512-4). This might suggest that the 
Transcendental Analytic describes the constitution of phenomenal objects on the basis 
of the notion of truth. 
Generic references to Kant’s employment of a correspondence jargon – for 
instance, to his mention of the relation of representations to objects – might make 
Cassirer’s view intuitively plausible. However, they are not sufficient to prove it. What 
would prove Cassirer’s view is a mention or presupposition of the notion of truth in 
Kant’s definition or most perspicuous characterization of phenomenal object. Yet Kant 
  
11 
does not employ the notion of truth in his characterizations of the notion of 
phenomenal object, such as those in T2, T3, T6, and A 106. The passages on the 
“Copernican turn” in the relation between cognitions and objects do not employ the 
word “truth” either. 
Cassirer might well agree that Kant does not use the term “truth” in his 
characterizations of phenomenal objects. However, Cassirer might advance a further 
argument for the claim that Kant’s notion of phenomenal object presupposes the notion 
of truth. Cassirer might argue as follows. 
Kant’s descriptions of phenomenal objects (e.g., those in T2, T3, and T6) make 
reference to the manifold of intuition, synthesis, and rules. The rules at issue in T3 and 
T6 are the transcendental laws of knowledge. The process of synthesis mentioned in 
T3 is a process which takes place through the application of those rules. According to 
Kant’s texts, a phenomenal object is an item which can be represented as the result of a 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge. 
Kant relates not only the notion of phenomenal object, but also the notion of truth, 
to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge. He relates those notions in several passages, such as two passages from the 
Prolegomena. The first states: 
T7 The difference between truth and dream […] is not decided through the quality of 
the representations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but 
through their connection according to the rules that determine the combination of 
representations in the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand 
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together in one experience. (4:290-291, italics added) 
The second passage discusses whether “experience carries with itself sure criteria to 
distinguish it from imagination.” In this context, Kant writes: 
T8 Here the doubt can easily be removed, and we always remove it in ordinary life by 
investigating the connection of appearances in both space and time according to 
universal laws of experience, and if the representation of outer things consistently 
agrees therewith, we cannot doubt that those things should not constitute truthful 
experience. (4:337, italics added; see 4:374-375 and A 492/B 520-521) 
According to the quoted passages, once one has a mental representation of appearances, 
and hence once one has empirical intuitions, those appearances will represent actual 
objects if and only if they conform to the transcendental laws of knowledge. This is 
tantamount to saying that a judgment based on empirical intuitions is true if and only if 
it conforms to the transcendental laws of knowledge. 
Kant’s reference to intuitions and synthesis in his characterizations of phenomenal 
objects might be an implicit reference to the notion of truth, or at least to the notion of 
empirical truth: empirical truth consists in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
according to the transcendental laws of knowledge,18 and this very synthesis is at the 
basis of the notion of phenomenal object. If this is so, then Kant’s notion of 
phenomenal object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth 
as correspondence of judgments with phenomenal objects, on pain of circularity. 
This argument can be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) Kant defines the notion of phenomenal object by mentioning the synthesis of 
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the manifold of intuition according to the transcendental laws of knowledge. 
 (2) Empirical truth consists in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition according 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge. 
∴
 
(3) Kant’s definition of phenomenal object presupposes the notion of truth. 
 
∴
 
(4) Kant cannot define truth as correspondence of a judgment with a phenomenal 
object (on pain of circularity). 
This argument is not tenable, because the link between the transcendental laws of 
knowledge and empirical truth is weaker than the link between those laws and the 
notion of phenomenal object. 
In the above texts (T2, the end of T3, and T6), Kant illustrates what a phenomenal 
object is by making reference to the synthesis of intuitions according to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge. To say that x is a phenomenal object is to say that, 
once certain empirical intuitions are synthesized according to the transcendental laws 
of knowledge, they will yield a representation of x. 
By contrast, the Critical Kant never writes: to say that a judgment or an empirical 
judgment is true is to say that it is the result of a synthesis of empirical intuitions 
according to the transcendental laws of knowledge. He does not even write that being 
true is being supported by intuitions and conforming to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge, with two sole exceptions: one sentence in Reflexion 5642, a personal note 
that Kant did not intend to publish (18:28016-18), and one sentence in a transcript of his 
logic lectures, the Logic Hechsel.19 However, the latter sentence is in contrast with 
statements which are right above and below it in the same passage.20 Thus, only one 
sentence from a personal note can count as evidence for the claim that the Critical Kant 
defined truth as agreement with intuitions and with the transcendental laws of 
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knowledge. This is very weak evidence. 
Passages such as T7 and T8 prove at most that being warranted by intuitions, plus 
conforming to the transcendental laws of knowledge, is a feature coextensive with 
empirical truth: all true empirical judgments, and only true empirical judgments, 
conform to the transcendental laws of knowledge and are supported by empirical 
intuitions. However, claiming this is not sufficient to explain what empirical truth is. 
Even if all philosophers and only philosophers wore red hats, “wearing a red hat” 
would not be an explanation of what it means to be a philosopher. Even if all and only 
those vertebrates which have a liver had a heart, “being a vertebrate with a heart” 
would not be an explanation of what it means to be a vertebrate with a liver. By the 
same token, even if all true empirical judgments and only true empirical judgments 
conformed to the transcendental laws of knowledge and were supported by empirical 
intuitions, conforming to the transcendental laws of knowledge and being supported by 
empirical intuitions might not be an explanation of what it means to be a true empirical 
judgment. Being a true empirical judgment might rather mean to correspond to an 
empirical, or phenomenal, object. 
Kant does not aim to explain what truth is in T7 and T8. Instead, he aims to 
provide a criterion to distinguish waking experiences from dreaming experiences. He 
provides that criterion in order to show that transcendental idealism does not give the 
same status to real objects in space and time and to the imaginary objects of dreams 
and illusions. Kant is keen to show this to differentiate his transcendental idealism 
from the idealism of his predecessors, like Berkeley. In Kant’s view, the idealism of 
his predecessors is unable to account for the difference between real objects and 
imaginary ones (see Prol., 4:374-375). 
Kant’s criterion to distinguish waking experiences from dreaming experiences 
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also serves as a criterion to distinguish true judgments about empirical objects from 
false judgments about those objects: 
If you can formulate a judgment p as the result of a synthesis of empirical 
intuitions according to the transcendental laws of knowledge, then p is true. If 
you can formulate the negation of a judgment p as the result of a synthesis of 
empirical intuitions according to the transcendental laws of knowledge, then 
p is false.21 
This criterion is fully compatible with a correspondence conception of empirical 
truth. Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “truth is the agreement of a 
cognition with its object.”22 This claim entails that true judgments correspond with the 
objects they are about. That definition, being only “nominal,” does not provide a 
criterion to distinguish true from false judgments.23 The possibility of formulating a 
judgment as the result of the synthesis of empirical intuitions according to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge provides a test or criterion to establish which 
empirical judgments satisfy the correspondence nominal definition of truth. 
In effect, the great majority of the sentences that start with the expressions “truth 
consists in” and “truth is” in Kant’s Critical corpus make reference to objects. They 
state that truth is the agreement of a cognition with the object it is about, or they lay 
out slight variations of this formula. At least eleven of those passages do not prefix this 
formula with: “the nominal definition of truth is,” “the nominal essence of truth is,” 
“the concept of truth is,” or “the meaning of ‘is true’ is.”24 Hence, Kant uses that 
formula to explain what truth, the very property of truth, literally is. 
If this is correct, then the explanation of what a phenomenal object is mentions the 
transcendental laws of knowledge, and the definition of truth employs the notion of 
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object (be it a phenomenal object or an object in the broad sense). It follows that Kant 
does not explain what a phenomenal object is by means of the notion of truth. Vice 
versa, he explains what truth is by means of the notion of object. Thus, in the argument 
outlined at pp. 12-13, (2) and (3) are both false. It is false that, for Kant, truth consists 
in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge, and it is false that Kant’s notion of phenomenal object presupposes the 
notion of truth. 
5 Actuality and Truth 
Although Kant does not define the notions of object or of phenomenal object by means 
of the notion of truth, he might define the notion of actuality by means of the notion of 
truth. If he does, then he cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgment with 
actual objects, on pain of circularity. 
However, Kant does not employ the terms “truth” and “true,” when he explains 
what actuality is. Kant’s Critical works contain two major explanations of the notion of 
actuality. The first is in the postulates of empirical thinking in general (A 225-226/B 
272-274). The second is in the section of the first Critique on the transcendental ideal 
of God (A 597-601/B 625-629). These texts contain no occurrence of the word “true,” 
but one occurrence of the word “truth.” The occurrence of “truth” is in a sentence on 
the transcendental truth of the categories (A 222/B 269). That sentence does not make 
any reference whatsoever to the truth of judgments or cognitions. The transcripts of 
Kant’s metaphysics lectures from the Critical period do not employ the notion of truth 
to explain what actuality is either.25 They only state, on one occasion, that the truth of 
judgments corresponds to the actuality of objects, without adding any further comment 
on the relation between these two notions (M. Schön, 28:49332-33). If Kant intended to 
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define actuality by means of the notion of truth, he could at least be more explicit. 
Nevertheless, a supporter of Cassirer’s view might formulate the following 
argument for the claim that the notion of truth is implicit in Kant’s notion of actuality. 
The second postulate of empirical thinking characterizes the actuality of a phenomenal 
object as its agreement with the formal and material conditions of experience (A 218/B 
265-266). The formal conditions of experience are the transcendental laws of 
knowledge. The material conditions of experience are the deliverances of the senses. 
Kant characterizes empirical truth in very similar terms. Empirical truth is the 
coherence of a judgment or cognition with the transcendental laws of knowledge and 
the deliverances of the senses. If this is so, then Kant’s explanation of actuality 
mentions the material and formal conditions which constitute his characterization of 
empirical truth. This is a disguised reference to empirical truth in the explanation of 
actuality. 26  Thus the notion of actuality, and thereby the notion of actual object, 
presupposes the notion of empirical truth. It follows that Kant cannot define truth as 
correspondence of a judgment with actual objects, on pain of circularity. 
This argument fails for two reasons. The first reason is that Kant does not explain 
what truth is in terms of agreement with the transcendental laws of knowledge and the 
deliverances of the senses. As we have seen in Section 4, Kant claims at most that 
empirical truth on the one hand, and the agreement with the transcendental laws of 
knowledge and the deliverances of the senses on the other hand, are coextensive 
features. This is compatible with several alternative accounts of what truth is (for 
instance, a correspondence account and a coherence account). 
The second reason is that the second postulate of empirical thinking does not 
explain what actuality is. The second postulate of empirical thinking is one of the 
synthetic principles of the pure understanding. These principles explain under which 
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conditions the mind must apply each category to the deliverances of the senses: 
T9 For they are nothing other than propositions that subsume all perceptions 
(according to certain universal conditions of intuition) under those pure concepts 
of the understanding. (4:302) 
T10 These higher principles alone provide the concept, which contains the condition 
and as it were the exponent for a rule in general, while experience provides the 
case which stands under the rule. (A 159/B 198, trans. modified) 
The second postulate of empirical thinking explains under which conditions the mind 
must apply the category of actuality to the deliverances of the senses, already 
subsumed under the transcendental forms of intuition and the categories of quantity, 
quality, and relation. The second postulate prescribes: 
apply the category of actuality to x if and only if x conforms to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge and you have empirical intuitions of x. 
The x ranges over representations of empirical objects. 
This formula implies that one must class every item which conforms to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge, and of which one has empirical intuitions, as actual. 
It does not imply that being actual means satisfying those conditions. In effect, 
according to Kant, God is actual (A 695-696/B 723-724), but it does not satisfy those 
conditions, because we cannot have empirical intuitions of God. If the above formula 
provided an explanation of what actuality is, that explanation would apply only to the 
actuality of phenomenal objects. “Actuality” would have a different meaning when 
applied to God. Therefore, “actuality” would be an ambiguous term. However, Kant 
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never states that “actuality” is ambiguous. He gives a non-ambiguous explanation of 
actuality, based on the notion of absolute positing, in the section of Transcendental 
Dialectic entitled “The Ideal of Pure Reason.” That explanation extends over 
phenomenal objects, as well as over non-phenomenal items such as God.27 
If this is so, then the second postulate of empirical thinking is similar to passages 
T7 and T8. Those passages provide a test to establish the truth of empirical judgments, 
but they do not provide a definition of empirical truth. Likewise, the second postulate 
of empirical thinking provides a test to establish whether a phenomenal object is actual, 
but it does not explain what being actual is. 
To sum up, the above argument for the claim that Kant defines actuality by means 
of the notion of truth fails. This is because of two reasons. First, truth is not the 
agreement of a judgment with the formal and material conditions of possible 
experience. Second, actuality is not the agreement of an object with the formal and 
material conditions of possible experience. As Kant characterizes neither the notion of 
actuality, nor his two notions of object by means of the notion of truth, Cassirer’s 
argument must be rejected. Other arguments may be more successful than Cassirer’s in 
proving that Kant’s idealism is incompatible with a correspondence theory of truth. 
In conclusion, the study and refutation of Cassirer’s argument alone does not 
enable us to conclusively establish whether Kant can endorse a correspondence theory 
of truth. However, it suggests that we should not trust short arguments from a certain 
ontological outlook to a particular theory of truth. In absence of general arguments for 
the incompatibility of idealism with a correspondence theory of truth, the answer to the 
question of whether an idealist ontology is compatible with a correspondence theory, 
and the evaluation of any argument for this claim, require a careful examination of the 
ontology and theory of truth at stake. A detailed examination is also necessary to 
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establish if Kant, or recent upholders of various forms of idealism, internal realism, 
and anti-realism, can consistently endorse a correspondence theory of truth. 
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